

3/17/09 9:11 AM  
ANF\DRAWT\1958

The RAND I came to in the early summer of 1958 was preoccupied with one problem, all departments: fending off the danger of a Soviet surprise attack, Pearl Harbor-type, by discovering and remedying vulnerabilities in SAC retaliatory forces that the Soviets could exploit to disarm the United States and rule the world.

The previous fall—by coincidence, just a month after I had visited RAND in Santa Monica after a summer seminar on probability theory at Stanford [describe—earlier?—what brought me to visit RAND, why they were interested in me, and my experience of Santa Monica] —Sputnik had demonstrated to the world that the Soviets, with the capability to put a satellite in orbit, also had the rocket lift and precision to send an ICBM with a thermonuclear warhead to a target in the US.

[describe the US public and media reaction. The “science gap.” Funds for science and engineering. US unable to lift a satellite into orbit: the NASA rockets, non-military, were smaller than the Soviets were using (an ICBM booster) and unreliable. Humiliating failures. The second Soviet satellite, this one huge, with Laika aboard. Panic (though Ike said, “It’s not going to fall on their heads.” Not reassuring.)

Gaither Report (summarize): based on RAND R-290, AJW and Rowen. (note membership) Rockefeller Report, likewise. (When do I get my TS clearance, so I can read R-290 and R-266?)

The intelligence estimates were that the Soviets were well ahead of us in their ICBM program, and were probably (?) on a crash program, which would give them a significant capability against our 26 SAC bases in the ZI (Zone of the Interior: Continental US) perhaps by 1959, certainly by 1960, heading toward a huge force in the early Sixties, well ahead of the US.

AJW and his RAND colleagues had promoted an analysis of great vulnerability of SAC well before Sputnik, based on estimates of SU bomber capabilities, with only a minor role for ICBMs and sub-based missiles if any. So Albert insisted into the Sixties that his analysis of a “deterrence gap” had never rested fundamentally on predictions of a “missile gap.” But the addition of even twenty to forty Soviet ICBMs enhanced the possibilities of a disarming surprise attack ominously.

Back at the Society of Fellows at Harvard, I spent the fall of 1957 and spring of 1958 working on my ideas about “ambiguous” uncertainties that could not be expressed by numerical probabilities, the work that was eventually published as “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms” in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1961 (?) and was elaborated in my Ph. D. thesis in 1962. But I kept in touch with these events, as who did not?

Eisenhower's reassurances and apparent calm about the challenge seemed to confirm the image of him as a retired grandfather, out of touch with reality, focused only on his golf game. That was the image shared by everyone I came to meet at RAND. It was paired with the notion that our sponsoring organization, the Air Force, which certainly didn't underrate the prospect of a vast Soviet superiority in ICBMs, didn't seem able bureaucratically to rise to that threat in an appropriate or effective way. That is, it was resisting or dragging its feet in adopting the recommendations that RAND had been making for several years at this point and which seemed all the more urgent after Sputnik.

Fixing the problem of SAC vulnerability was an obsession at RAND (not, it appeared perplexingly, in the Air Force), and the center of the obsessive ideation was the Economic Department, which I joined. In my first week, I was assigned to be the rapporteur of a discussion group (weekly? Or more often?) on responses to the strategic threat, including Albert Wohlstetter, Harry Rowen, Andy Marshall, and Fred Hoffman, the key strategic thinkers in the Department, and Herman Kahn of the Physics Department.

It was apparent from the beginning that this was as smart a bunch of men as I had ever encountered (and I had attended three meals a week for three years in the Society of Fellows, which had, in addition to the Junior and Senior Fellows, the brightest lights to visit Harvard as invited guests). And that first impression has never changed. But it was even better than that. In the middle of the first session, I ventured—though I was the youngest, assigned to be taking notes, and obviously a total novice on the issues—to express an opinion. Rather than showing irritation or ignoring my comment, Herman Kahn, brilliant and enormously fat, sitting directly across the table from me, looked at me soberly and said, "*You're absolutely wrong.*"

I remember the exact feeling that evoked. A warm glow spread throughout my body. That was the way Harvard Crimson editors had routinely spoken to each other. I hadn't experienced anything like it for six years. At King's College, Cambridge, or at the Society of Fellows (arguments in the Marine Corps had not been intellectual), disagreements didn't remotely take this form, gloves off, take-no-prisoners. I remember feeling: I've found a home.

(The truth is: fifty years later, I still have dreams at night of being back at RAND.)

And the subject matter was of the highest imaginable urgency. We were in the most literal sense trying to save the world. A successful Soviet nuclear attack would be a catastrophe not only for America. It was taken for granted that in the Soviet Union some equivalent of RAND in the Soviet Ministry of Defense or Missile Forces was working just as urgently and obsessively to exploit their lead in offensive forces while they had it, if not by a Pearl Harbor attack then by compelling blackmail against the US and its NATO allies. We were saving the world not only from our Soviet counterparts but from the possibly fatal lethargy and bureaucratic inertia of the Eisenhower administration and our sponsors, the Air Force.

MacBeth, Act. 4, scene 3

For mine own good,

135 All causes shall give way: I am in blood

136 Stepp'd in so far that, should I wade no more,

137 Returning were as tedious as go o'er.

3/28/09 2:14 PM  
 \ANC\Nuc book\3-28 outline

--chapter 1: 325 million dead...and, first strike, wide variety of circumstances. Moreover, under-estimated; and (later) possibility of nuclear winter. Concept of a Doomsday Machine; it existed; on a hair-trigger. We had built it. (Later, the Soviets did, too). How did it come to this? How did I come to this? That question was especially poignant, given my early predisposition toward nuclear weapons.

--Attitude toward bombing, WWII (Nazis). Magnesium bombs. (WP. Napalm. Flame-throwers (sic).) (Napalm in VN; WP in VN, Israel-Lebanon, Iraq.) (FIRE: nuc winter; Lynn Eden: omitted from bombing effects). Dad and bombing factory. (biggest plants.) Cranbrook, U-235. Hiroshima. Dad and Hanford; H-bomb. "1000 times A-bomb." Z-bomb. Dad on radioactivity at Hanford. Quit. "You did; Hersey; "the worst thing I've ever read."

Later, I join Marines instead of the Air Force. (Follow Secrets: a Cold Warrior; Berlin; Hiss (! Irony: Nixon later sees me as a Jewish Hiss). (draft test; my obligation to serve: follow Secrets: E: Indochina a real nuclear crisis, not known to me as I join Marines. (Following Alsop warnings of war: Extend for Suez (a nuclear crisis, of a sort—Khrushchev bluff—not known to me then). Brinksmandhip (regarded as Dulles bluff, but not a creditable one. My pride in Marine Commandant, Pate: "Marines have three divisions to sacrifice, to avoid going to nuclear war." [Instead, night fighting, knife fighting, Major Faser; asked for FMF infantry; platoon leader, company commander. Maj. Barber, greatest company action.]

Came out with respect for military, as well as confirmed Cold Warrior. (Hungary: my thoughts about UA, with respect to Hungary; and jumping ship rather than being confined by Egyptians. Jaffa Plan; Top Secret war plans; my security breach (?) Training schedules on ship: later reproduced in VN; Dad, on inspecting in the field. [see gap between orders on two-man control, vs. actuality; see bombs on German aircraft; see possibility of UA in Cuba, or in authentication procedures, suggested to me by my own inclinations. Dad-'s example of radioactive ducts at Hanford. {Where to bring in: Dad's emphasis on need to inspect in field; my activities in training, and in Vietnam. (Night in Vieques: platoon has set up a wire ambush).

Interest in military strategy. Katzenbach's seminar. (later, HAK). Sidney Fay, on WWI. Go back: Game theory, starting with vN-M book, thesis. And decision theory: Uncertainty. (Keynes, Knight). Barrington Moore paper on game theory and foreign policy (in grad school? Undergrad? I showed it to RAND in 1958!) Probability theory seminar at Stanford, 1957; visit to RAND. (First mention to me of RAND: my tutor Goodwin in 1952? Unveiled as a Communist in 1952-53 when I was at Cambridge; he explained; I had to mention him in my security forms, 1958-59.)

Fall, 1957: Sputnik. Panic; obsession with science gap, Missle Gap. (IBM becomes ICBM: Alsop). Accept summer invitation to RAND, 1958.

Bargaining theory. Focus on undeveloped areas in economics: uncertainty, and threats.

Vulnerability Study at RAND, 1958. Command and control: problem of unauthorized action. (Dr. Strangelove; Crimson Tide; Burt Lancaster movie (movies: one about coup. (Compare possibility in Japan, 1945). (aftermath of Cuba-II!) (JFK worries after Cuba-I; “if there are several of these...” Bring in? McN worry about impeachment if less than 1000 MM.) Concept of PAL. R-290; Pearl Harbor study; Delicate Balance (or was that later, in 1959?) (When was Gaither Report?)

After my summer at RAND: Lowell Lectures, The Art of Coercion. Theory and Practice of Blackmail. Crisis instability. The Political Uses of Madness. The Truly Intelligent Detonator. (my first problem at RAND: Command and control; Control: how to insure execute when the president ordered it—and only when the president ordered it: Command: on the basis of reliable warning, not false alarm, appropriate response “option”. My lectures to HAK seminar. BERLIN CRISIS.

RAND: C3. HK. (Kaufmann on HAK: vs. limited war. His book, 1956? N takes it into NSC. )

K at UN: shoe-pounding. We will bury you! Building like sausages. U-2 shoot-down. Disneyland. Paris Summit. Horlick-Rush papers.

--[see Fran Outline]

GROSS OUTLINE:

Harvard: uncertainty, threats.

Discoveries up to McGeorge Bundy briefing; Delegation Study; BNSP Draft; Iwakuni; JSCP; questions for Gilpatric; 325 million.. (RDT&E study! Guantanamo/Cuba invasion plans; Vietnam. Berlin game. (Kaysen/hsr FS plan; Raskin reaction). PALs.

(The reality of the delegation issue: new documents. Delegation as an issue in 1964: lies.)

Then: Missile Gap explodes. My RAND briefing: not believed. (Couldn’t give basis: T/K. Leibman had asked me, “Are you cleared for T/K?” (“These photos are worth a billion dollars.”)

Yet, rather than my (or anyone: see Garthoff) reconsidering everything; 1000 MM (see Keynesian motives: Ball; and McN fear of “impeachment”; no consideration of educating public and Congress (or admitting campaign error). My proposals to challenge K; Gilpatric speech (implicit FU threat! NATO policy and Berlin policy confirmed, by me.) Effects on K: Berlin? Cuba! (along with Turkish IRBMs; Mongoose! (EGL) Ann

Arbor speech (reflecting Athens speech, vs. French force) (note JFK decision to help French, in 1963, despite Ann Arbor speech). Life (?) interview on FS. (MY BNSP plan put to FS use!)

My thesis.

Cuban Missile Crisis. My involvement; what I learned. My reaction to proposal on Turkish missiles. [What I didn't learn, until later: see below (effects of secrecy, lies; clearances (PSALM, T/K Ideal), White House secrets, Soviet secrets): 1964: RFK two ultimatums (and offer on Turkish IRBMs); hsr consideration of possibility in summer; Nitze, Rusk, McN initial reactions; JFK/McN willingness to trade missiles, perhaps even Guantanamo; SAM not ordered by Khrushchev; thus, a reason for K backdown Sunday morning (fear of conventional invasion: but see later, poss of nuclear war started by Sov commanders); Nitze estimate of nuclear war (and JFK's: but misleading) (see my own, mistaken, low estimate).

1970's: : Mongoose; invasion plans; exercises;

1980's: SU nuc warheads, or delegation ; K had delegated, as we had! and, K imitation of US NATO posture; JFK plan to concede to UN (thus, how close to SU victory; and how close to nuclear war: dangers of JFK (and K) playing chicken, temporizing, delaying concession. Alert dangers; SU submarine.

--My study of nuclear crises. Role of president (Suez, C-I, U-2). Faits malaccomplis: effects of emotion, anger, humiliation; of being misled (inadvertently). Discovery of Quemoy as a nuclear crisis. Linkage of crises: Lebanon (misinterpreted: a nuclear crisis involving Iraq and Kuwait!) to Quemoy. (C-I to C-II, on US side).

--FULL STORY OF C-II.

--I go into VN planning. See Secrets. But now tell: Vietnam and nuclear threats. 1954; 1954-1960; Laos; 1964 (discussion in spring; then, Seaborn); 1965 McN; JCS on China (earlier, Rusk, 1964); [Hyp: Was real motive of VN/Laos: nuclear attacks on China?]; consideration of attacks on Chinese nuc program in 1964-65; Ike advice on nucs, 1966; McN real concerns from 1966-68? (see comments in Fog of War); Khe Sanh, 1968; N to Republicans in 1968, secret plan;

--My concern about eventual use of nucs, as of fall 69 (MHH). PP. What I didn't know: Duck Hook, November ultimatum. Learned in 1974: began study of FU threats. N/HAK background (Ahmad manuscript).

--1964: Chinese test. Indian request, Rusk/McN reaction. ISA response. Gilpatric committee. RFK leak. Real attitudes toward proliferation. (Israel...) "Why shouldn't our friends have the Bomb, when our enemies do?" (India, Japan, Pakistan: though, vs. South Korea, Taiwan,...) Ambivalence. (We want to control events and threats, but want them dependent: but find obligation to protect them burdensome, dangerous...)

(Brazil, Argentina; Sweden? Germany...(MLF; “key” arrangements; Steinbrunner; German issue (see Trachtenberg).

--Role of FU threats throughout Cold War, and beyond. Relation to empire; relation of FU threats to strategic force structure (not just “overkill”: service to highest-level objectives, as well as to domestic politics).

Somewhere:

The D-L objective, second-strike or first-strike (results in first strike forces, as now). When it made some sense; how it has not since 1964-65. (relation to ABM, Civil Defense: but frauds anyway.) Decapitation: leading to LOW and SU Perimetr/Dead Hand.

Preemption.

Crisis instability: TCS and me.

Arms control: supposedly addressed to stability, actually not.

Anti-proliferation fraud.

Bush doctrines not new, just expanded and explicit.

When were we really close to nuc war, and how close?

Current status of nuclear winter.

Radical restructuring and abolition: relation of non-proliferation to these; FU policy as crucial obstacle (along with D-L, FS backup). (Targets and forces cannot be reduced sharply so long as FS threat must back up FU threats, even if both are regarded by us as bluffs: need for appearance of credibility, as if we believed in them and might act on them, and believed opponents believed we believed...) (NFU removes insider, secret rationale for FS forces; that doesn’t automatically lead to restructuring of forces, but it makes it possible, in terms of rationale, if not in terms of domestic politics; it is *necessary* to concrete changes both in tactical forces and deployment and in strategic forces; and it *can* and *should* (even, *must*, if we are to move toward abolition and if we are to survive) lead to and be expressed in concrete changes, even though a change in verbal declarations doesn’t guarantee this.

HISTORY OF STRATEGIC BOMBING, AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN MASSACRE.

4-16-09

## Books:

Slides can be  
very well kept - a  
process, planning, com  
How? Describer

What can't be kept  
secret?

Own's responsibility  
(US, us, USG  
a policy)

(to decide what? Why?  
What is the secret foreign  
policy? Who decides it? serve?  
Owns)

4-6-09  
For Biden's Case

Do & still believe  
that "the truth shall  
prevail as far"?

....

that telling the truth  
is sufficient to dissociate  
ourselves from complicity  
in wrong-doing

What doesn't by itself change  
the process:

PP; revelation of NSA

ICG; May; TORTURE

(Mayne, Bush, Donley...)

NSA Taps (Tamm, NYT)

(From? Herd? Mayfield)  
(Anderson = 2nd street  
or from?)

~~THUR~~

4-14-9

My book

Dilection  
named J VCS in  
1988

Per definition is 56

(What triggered?)

Efforts to cerebral,  
lie, violent —

VS. DETERRENCE  
(per David Hume; K - C-II)  
S# in 2001 film, Dr Strangelove

infinity (low, David Hume,  
DECAP, FS & II)

Boob: Put-downs of WB  
(1)  
- He's crazy

- He doesn't know what  
he was talking about -  
out of the loop

- Out-moded; OBE

- 1

- It's been fuged. (Took  
8-16-9 NYT on illegal  
numbers) -

- Better, departmental